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Abstract 
This study is meant, first of all, to analyze the incriminations that the new Romanian Criminal Code sets for the 
protection of a person’s private life as a social value of maximum significance both for the human being and for 
any democratic society as a whole.There are two criminal offences treated in this study that are not to be found 
in the current criminal legislation: violation of private life and criminal trespassing of a legal person’s property. 
Likewise, the study will bring forth the novelties and the differences regarding the offences of criminal 
trespassing of a natural person’s property, disclosure of professional secret, violation of secret correspondence, 
illegal access to computerized system and illegal interception of electronic data transfer – acts that when, 
directly or indirectly, committed can cause harm to the intimacy of a person’s life.As an expression of the 
interdisciplinary nature of this subject, the study also sets out, as a subsidiary aspect, an evaluation of the 
circumstances under which the new criminal proceeding legislation allows public authorities to interfere with an 
individual’s private life. Thus, the emphasis is on the analysis of the circumstances under which special 
surveillance and investigation techniques can be used as evidence proceedings regulated by the new Romanian 
Criminal Procedure Code.  
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Introduction.  
I.  General aspects. Modern society includes, among the individual’s most important values, 
his private life, whilst both international and national legislation being more and more preoccupied 
with the protection of this fundamental right of human being.  
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights stipulates under Article 12, that „No one shall be 
subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, or to the attacks 
upon his honour and reputation. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks.” Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides, 
in Article 17, „1. No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, 
family, home or correspondence, neither to unlawful attacks on his honour and reputation. 2. 
Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.” Article 8 of 
the European Convention of Human Rights shows that “1. Everyone has the right to respect for his 
private and family life, his home and his correspondence. 2. There shall be no interference by a 
public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is 
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic 
well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or offence, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” The American Convention of 
Human Rights expresses in a similar manner under Article 11, 2-3: “2. No one may be the object of 
arbitrary or abusive interference with his private life, his family, his home, or his correspondence, or 
of unlawful attacks on his honor or reputation. 3. Everyone has the right to the protection of the law 
against such interference or attacks.”  
Transposing the international regulations onto national level, Article s 26-28 from the 
Constitution of Romania establish, as fundamental rights, intimate life, family and private life, home 
inviolability and the secret of correspondence. 
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As none of these terms enjoy a legal definition, it was the duty of doctrine and jurisprudence 
to establish their meaning and content.  
In Western juridical literature, private life was, practically, understood as a secret sphere of 
the individual’s life, where the access of third parties
1 is not allowed. Respect for private life implies 
the guarantee of a person’s physical and moral integrity, the protection of his personal or social 
identity, of his sexuality, of private places
2, as well as the protection of reputation and the prevention 
of disclosure of confidential information
3. A person can consider as being part of his private life any 
aspect that may be associated with his health, moral, religious or philosophical believes, his 
sentimental and family life, his friendships
4. It was also noted that private life includes the 
individual’s right to intimate, personal life, his right to social private life and the right to a healthy 
environment
5.  
Striving to find meanings as precise as possible for the concept of “private life”, it was 
noticed that, Romanian doctrine
6 makes a distinction between the texts of the European Convention 
and those of the Romanian Constitution, the latter using a concept that the first is avoiding, namely 
intimate life. It has been noted that intimate life is only a part of private life, which, first of all, 
contains the right to solitude, that is the individual’s right to be with himself, to seclude from the 
others, to keep the secret of his own thoughts, plans and desires, to be left alone with his ideas and 
aspirations, but also with his behavior through which he intends to express his personality, 
unhindered by any outside interference. Secondly, intimate life also implies contacts with other 
persons “in the presence of whom the subject feels like being only with himself”, to whom he can 
express his deepest thoughts; the contacts with these persons can be oral, when the interlocutors are 
present, but also through letters, telegrams, telephone conversations when absent.  
On its turn, private life is considered to be made of the right to intimate life, with all the above 
mentioned elements included to which we also add a sphere of the subject’s business and 
professional contacts are also added. Thus, we consider that private life represents a particular area of 
personal thoughts and acts, of communications and conversations that are not suppressed, a personal 
inviolable space where the individual can express his inner personality; but it also includes intimate 
or professional contacts with the others. 
When approaching the issue of the protection of private life from its values’ point of view, 
another author
7 notices that the risks associated to this fundamental right regard the violation of the 
person’s solitude, interference into his personal matters, disclosure of personal information – which 
entails a harm on the individual’s image in society – using the name or image of a person for the 
benefit of the one who uses them, creating IT systems of personal data.   
The jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights has proven to be an essential 
source in establishing the constituent elements of private life, although, several times
8, the European 
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court considered that it is not possible and neither necessary to give an exhaustive definition to the 
concept, because its content changes according to various factors (for instance: the period of time it 
refers to, the society in which the individual spends his life). The Court considers that private life can 
not be limited only to the inner circle where a person lives his life the way he wants and from which 
he excludes the exterior world, but, to a certain extent, it also includes the individual’s right to build 
relations with his fellow men, thus there is no major reason for eliminating professional or business 
activities. In other words, there are areas of interaction between a person and the others, even in a 
public environment, which can be included in the concept of private life
9; similarly, data of public 
nature referring to an individual can also be considered as part of private life, in case they are 
collected and systematically stored in the records of public authorities
10. Likewise, the right to 
respect for private life also comprises the right to its confidentiality
11, the right to the individual’s 
physical and moral integrity
12, including sexual life, the right to information regarding his own or his 
parents’ identity
13, the right to rest in his own house
14, the right to one’s own image
15, the right to act 
in a certain manner
16.  
There is an interrelation between private life and the inviolability of correspondence, meaning 
the right of one person to communicate his thoughts using any means
17 – verbal, letters, telegrams, 
fax, telex, pager, phone, e-mail, SMS, and MMS – without being known by third parties or censored. 
CEDH jurisprudence presents a wide range of cases on this matter
18. The protection of the 
individual’s correspondence is so strong that the Court considered a breach of Article 8 of the 
Convention when the authorities taped the telephone conversations in which the subject allegedly 
instigated to murder
19 or the case when the subject admitted he was dealing in drugs
20. 
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Both private life and the right to privacy of correspondence are strongly connected to a 
person’s home
21. According to the case-law of the European Commission, home is an autonomous 
concept, which is not limited to the meaning given by the civil law; in order to consider a certain area 
as home we have to take into consideration the real circumstances of each cause, and considering a 
sufficient and continuous connection with a certain place
22. „Home” is usually the defined physical 
area where a person can live his private or family life, including secondary residences, vacation 
houses
23, a parcel of land in a nomad destined area
24, but, through extension, it is also the place 
where a person’s professional activity is conducted. The headquarters and bureaus of a company
25 
can also be regarded, within certain limits
26, as home.  
II. Penal protection of private life in Romania. The New Criminal Code of Romania (NCC)
27, 
passed by Law No 286/2009, brings a significant improvement to the area of means of protection of 
the individual’s private life, both by introducing new incriminations (violation of private life, 
violation of professional office, harassment), as well as by rephrasing some of the already existing 
incriminations (violation of home, disclosure of professional secrecy, violation of the secret of 
correspondence, illegal access to IT system, illegal intercepting of a IT transmission of data, 
unauthorized transfer of IT data). In respect to the formal systematization, yet, we note that, although 
these actions harm in a certain way a person’s intimacy, they are not totally stipulated under the 
chapter “offences against the inviolability of home and private life” (chapter IX, Title I, Special 
Book). Thus, we find again “harassment” under the chapter destined to “offences regarding the 
obligation of helping those endangered”, violation of the secret of correspondence is part of the 
category “offences relating to working”, while other offences are grouped under Chapter VI 
(“violation of the security and integrity of IT systems or data”). We consider that such 
systematization was chosen because of the complex specialized judicial object of these offences, the 
social values and relations protected by the law being, at the same time, part of a lot of fields that the 
legislator had in mind.  
We shall make a short presentation of the novelties brought by the NCC on this matter, 
generally, approaching a systematization in respect to that part of private life, which is mainly 
protected by the criminal rule, as follows: the protection of intimacy, the protection of 
correspondence, the protection of home. 
II. 1. The protection of intimacy. We have grouped here the aspects regarding the offences 
against privacy, the disclosure of professional secrecy and harassment and illegal access to IT 
system. 
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Violation of privacy (Article 226 NCC). This incrimination can not be found in the Criminal 
Code of 1968. The source of inspiration for the Romanian legislator was the legislations of Western 
states
28.  
The NCC regulates the offence relating to the violation of privacy in a standard, aggravating 
and absorbed form.  
In a standard form, the offence consists in unlawfully harming one person’s privacy, by 
taking, catching or recording the picture of a person, by wiretapping or recording a person who is on 
a private place, room or one of its auxiliary building or a person’s private conversation.  
Speaking about the external element (actus reus), the material element for this offence is the 
act of harming a person’s private life, namely to injure, hurt, and prejudice one’s own intimacy. From 
a ruling prospective, the material element can be accomplished by the following means: 
a) taking, catching or recording pictures of a person.  
Taking pictures refers to the operation through which, using a certain device designed for this 
purpose or that has a technical function for this purpose (for example, a mobile phone), based on 
certain procedures specific to optic laws, an image is put on a paper, photographic board, 
photosensitive tablet or on a photographic film. 
To catch pictures means to intercept visual representations, using certain technical means. 
Recording pictures means to impress, through electromagnetic methods, visual 
representations on certain data storage devices (magnetic tape, photosensitive film, etc.). The 
operation of recording not only implies catching but also saving, storing the pictures. Therefore, 
recording pictures always implies their catching, but the reciprocal is not valid; we can have an 
operation of catching a visual representation, but without having it recorded (for example, the 
subject, unlawfully, acquires and visualizes, with the help of such technical means, pictures of the 
victim staying in his own home, but he does not saves them by recording).  
The three ruling means of the material element are alternative, thus committing any of them 
constitutes an offence. If the subject commits the act resorting to two or three means, there shall be 
one single offence.  
The doctrine
29 has, reasonably, noticed that the act of tacking a picture or filming a home or a 
private room is not an offence, but it is required that the act aims at a person being in one of these 
spaces. Yet, we ask ourselves if the reason and spirit of this regulation – the protection of the 
individual’s intimacy – should not have needed a wider incrimination, which could cover other 
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hypothesis too, when the right to privacy is violated. For example, we consider that a significant 
harm to intimacy is also made by the act of recording pictures from inside the victim’s house, when 
he is not present, by filming certain personal use staff, indicating a certain sexual orientation 
(homosexual relations). Such an offence does not fulfil the constituting elements of the offence in 
question, although it obviously harms the individual’s private life. Or, ubi ratio este, idem est jus. 
One could argue that the perpetrator will be hold responsible for home violation, but we find this 
argument not functional in all the cases. For example, when, with a telephonic approval of the victim, 
who is outside the city, a neighbor breaks his door in order to turn off the water, which out of 
negligence, had been left running and there was a risk of flooding; if the neighbor, out of curiosity, 
exceeds the approval given by the homeowner and films his bedroom, the offence does not constitute 
a violation of home and neither of privacy.  
Thus, we assess that a form of incrimination that answers adequately to the necessities to 
protect the individual’s intimacy, was postulated under Act No 301/2004, which has not been 
enforced
30 yet. Thus, Article 209 from this law punishes “the violation of a person’s right to private 
life by using any means of remote interception of data, information, images or sounds from inside the 
places noted by Article 208 point 1 (namely a dwelling, room or one of its auxiliary buildings – 
author’s note, R.S.), without the consent of the person that uses them or the law authorization”. We 
consider,  lege ferenda, that the text of Article 226 NCC should be rethought to cover also the 
hypothesis of unlawful recording of images from a dwelling, room or one of its auxiliary buildings, 
even when the person is not at home, if this act harms his private life.  
The doctrine
31 also considered that, although the law does not stipulate, the protection is also 
extended to the enclosed area surrounding the victim’s residence and which is enclosed. We are 
reluctant to this point of view, as – according to our opinion – such a hypothesis is stipulated by the 
incrimination rule. If the law had intended to mention the enclosed area too, it would have done it 
explicitly, just as in the case of violation of home. Yet, it is undoubtedly that the legislator’s choice is 
questionable, as, for example, a person’s intimacy is harmed in the same way as when he is 
unlawfully filmed in his courtyard, not only when he is inside the house. An individual’s private 
space does not end at his home door. On the other hand, we do not see the reason for which the act of 
unlawfully entering an enclosed area of a person’s residence, even when he is not at home, 
constitutes an offence, (the violation of home), and the act of filming
32 a person in his own courtyard 
does not constitutes an offence. We need to mention that if the acts of taking pictures or filming a 
person who is on enclosed area representing an auxiliary building do not constitute the of offence of 
violation of private life, it can still constitute the offence of harassment (they can represent actual 
means through which the action of observing a person occurs, under the provisions of Article 208 
NCC), under the condition that this action is repeated and causes the victim to fear.  
b) wiretapping or audio recording  
Wiretapping means to seize or overhear sounds, and to record means to fix, impress on a data 
storage devices sound representations.  
These acts regard either simple sounds, or private conversations. Yet, the provisions under 
Article 226 NCC do not protect all types of private communications, but only direct, verbal ones 
shared by two or more persons (the so-called indoor conversation). Although private, the 
communications through technical means (for example, using a telephone) enjoy the protection 
established by the incrimination of violation of the secret of correspondence, and specifically 
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stipulated under the provisions of Article 302 point 2 NCC. Our conclusion is also confirmed by the 
verb used by the legislator to designate the material element of the external element; Article 226 
point 1 NCC refers to “wiretapping”, and not “intercepting” (as it is the case of the violation of the 
secret of correspondence)
33, the latter being specific to technical means of remote communication. 
There are several substantial requirements associated to these means of the material element. 
Firstly, overhearing sounds or conversations is an offence only when is committed through technical 
means (tape recorder, recorder, etc.). Merely listening to a conversation held inside a dwelling (for 
example, by keeping the ear close to the separating wall) does not constitute an offence.  
Secondly, the act can be associated to either the sounds uttered by the victim or, depending on 
the situation, the conversations he has inside a dwelling, room or one of its auxiliary building, or 
private conversations. There are certain differences between the two hypotheses.  
Thus, on the one hand, the law protects against the unauthorized interferences all the sounds 
and conversations that a persons makes within his private space. Taking into consideration the 
indissoluble connection between a person’s private life and home, we can state that the legislator, 
implicitly, admits a presumption of confidentiality over all that happens inside the individual’s 
private space, a presumption equally originating both in the special nature of this place and in the 
fundamental principle of the inviolability of home (Article 8 of ECHR and Article 27 of the 
Constitution). In terms of private space, in the case of the offence relating to the violation of private 
life, the law has in view the dwelling, room and its auxiliary building, except for the enclosed area 
around it.  
On the other hand, all the other conversations that the individual has outside his home or his 
room or outside their auxiliary buildings are protected, under the condition of having a private nature. 
By the following phrasing, in a rather redundant manner, „ wiretapping […] or audio recording of a 
person who is in a dwelling or room or one of its auxiliary building or of a private conversation (our 
note – R.S.)”; the legislator intended only to emphasize that the concept of private conversation is a 
wider category compared to the conversation held in a private space. It is a part to whole type of 
relations. Practically, the protection of the criminal rule extends not only to the conversations inside 
one’s own home, room or auxiliary building, but also to the private conversations that the individual 
has outside these places, regardless of the place, whether in another person’s private place, or just in 
a public place. For example, it shall constitute an offence the act of, unlawfully, audio-recording a 
private conversation held in the courtyard of the residence (an area, which, under the strict meaning 
of Article 226 point 1 NCC, is not a private space).  
The Romanian legislator thought it necessary to resort to this type of phrase construction of 
text considering that, in absence of a legal definition of the private conversation, doctrine has 
outlined two theories (criteria) to distinguish the concept
34. Thus:  
- the theory of the privileged place, specific to the British law. According to this theory, the 
nature of a conversation exclusively depends on the place where it is held. Consequently, we shall 
have a private conversation only if it is held in a private space; 
- the theory relating to the nature of communication, specific to the American and French 
legislation. According to this theory, in order to classify a conversation as private, the stress does not 
fall on the place where it is held, but on the corroboration of two elements – the mental element 
(mens rea) and the external element. The mental element is represented by the subject’s expectation 
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that the conversation is known only by his partner, and the external factor consists in the reasonable 
nature that this expectation must have considering the dominant rules of society. 
The Romanian legislator has provided efficiency to both criteria. The theory of the privileged 
space received an answer through the incrimination of the act of wiretapping and of audio-recording 
a person being inside a dwelling, room, or one of its auxiliary buildings. Nonetheless, the theory of 
the nature of communication was enforced by incriminating wiretapping or audio-recording of any 
other private conversations than those held in one’s own private space. For example, the act of 
someone who, unlawfully, records a private conversation of the victim with a third party in a theatre 
loge, in a restaurant booth, on a bench in the park, on the street, in a vehicle shall be punished; thus 
we notice that public places are also taken into consideration, but the accent falls under the 
confidentiality of the conversation.  
The difficulty emerges when trying to establish how the defendant, in a concrete situation, 
identifies whether a conversation is or is not private. This, because the law has to be predictable so 
that the subjects to whom it refers can adapt their behavior to the rule stipulated by the incriminating 
rule. In public places, people behave differently: some whisper, others speak loudly, some hide, 
others would try to impress even by speech. For example: two young lovers fight, loudly, on a bench 
in the park; at a family reunion, at a table in the courtyard, some persons talk fiercely about certain 
events from the lives of the participants. Are the passers-by authorized to record these talks? Or, is 
the producer of a TV show authorized to record the talks between a cheated wife, the adulterine 
husband and his mistress, who are observed in public, if only the wife (who had phoned the so-called 
detective) had consented to that?  
The answer to this problem derives from the provisions of Article 226 point 4 letter b) NCC, 
according to which there is no offence if the victim explicitly acted with the intent to be seen and 
heard by the offender. The text reveals, per a contrario, that an unlawful recording of a private 
conversation constitutes an offence in all situations when the victim was apart from any intention to 
be heard by others or, if such an intention existed, but it was not clearly expressed. Analyzing the 
entire construction of the Article 226 NCC, we assess that the provisions stipulated under point 4 
(including those under letter b) have the status of exceptions from the general rule, namely the 
private nature of any conversation. Consequently, we believe that the legislator implicitly uses a 
relative presumption of confidentiality of any communication between two or more persons.  
Thus, as we mentioned above, Article 226 NCC protects all the conversations of an individual 
in his private space, namely his home, room or one of its auxiliary buildings, as well as all the 
confidential conversations made outside this space. We note that the obligation imposed by the 
criminal law – not to wiretap or record private conversations on tape – has erga omnes effects, thus 
applying not only to third parties, but also to the participants in the conversation. Moreover, the act of 
the subject who unlawfully records a conversation, to which he is part of, shall constitute an offence. 
This conclusion is deduced by interpreting the provisions of Article 226 point 4 letter a) NCC, 
according to which the act of a person who attended a meeting together with the victim when sounds, 
talks or images, were registered, it shall not be a offence, but not under any circumstances, except the 
case when the subject justifies a legitimate interest. At first glance, such an area of incrimination is 
superfluous, because a recording is nothing but an exact fixing of an audio representation on a special 
device. Whether it is obvious that the recording made by a third party, who was not accepted to take 
part in the conversation between other two persons, is consider to be a violation of the privacy of 
those two, it seems more difficult to identify the reason for which the recording made by one of the 
participants in a conversation, even without the consent of the other, was categorized as an offence, 
and when the collected information is not further disclosed, disseminated, reported or transmitted to 
others (the problem, under these circumstances, also refers to taking, catching or recording images). 
The conversation itself, being a private one, involves sharing certain elements of intimacy that the 
allegedly victim is willingly and consciously revealing to the allegedly offender. One could claim 
that recording such a conversation does not harm intimacy anymore than the victim himself through Radu Slăvoiu 189 
his confessions. However, we believe that the criminal rule is welcomed, the legislator’s object 
being, probably, to provide the individual with a strong form of protection against those who, under a 
pretense friendship and by taking advantage of what the victims is telling, sometimes in cases of 
emotional vulnerability, turn the life of the victim into a subject of public controversy, deepening his 
suffering. For such a “friend”, recording the confessions of the victim constitutes “the supreme 
evidence”, an “excitement”, it represents the proof that the subject is real; further more, it protects 
him from the scepticism of the public (what else than the voice of the victim could be more 
convincing?) 
Postulating that this was also the legislator’s reasoning, we consider that further on the 
discussion must concentrate on the fairness of some authors’ opinion who state that “if the images 
are recorded, the taken pictures or the audio or visual recordings are kept only for personal purpose, 
without being disclosed to somebody else or to the public, the constituent elements of this offence are 
not accomplished
35”. The law makes a distinction not in respect to the destination of the images, 
pictures or recordings, but to whether the offender (who took part in the meeting with the victim) 
justifies or not a legitimate interest. We would rather assess that, if the circumstances of the case do 
not reveal that the recordings, pictures or images had been destined to disclosure, dissemination, 
reporting or transmission to others or to the public, it is unlikely to prove whether there was an 
intention to harm the victim’s private life, thus the act shall not be an offence due to the failure of 
accomplishing the conditions of the mental element.  
In respect to the problem of unlawful wiretapping or recording conversations, we note that – 
according to our opinion – there shall be as many offences as participants in a conversation, even if 
the action of the offender is single. Thus, if the agent recorded a private conversation in which three 
persons participated, there are three distinct offences, which constitute an ideal concurrence. This is 
due to the fact that, on one hand, private life, as a social value, has an absolutely personal nature, 
even when intimate issues are shared to others, and on the other hand, criminal law protects each 
person’s private life, and not the private life. However, we must notice that these offences can be 
committed in different ruling means. Thus, if somebody unlawfully records a conversation held by a 
person with his guest inside his home, the offence is represented by the act of recording a person in 
his home for the homeowner, and the offence of recording of a private conversation for the partner.  
The aggravating form of the offence of violation of private life refers to unlawful disclosure, 
dissemination, reporting or transmission of sounds, conversations or images to another person or to 
the public, according to the provisions of point 1. 
To disclose means to publicize, to reveal; disseminating signifies the spreading, propagation 
of sounds, conversations or images; to report means to present, show, expose them; and to transmit 
signifies to communicate, to let the others know about those sounds, conversations and images. All 
these acts represent the activity of the subject who divulges issues concerning a person’s intimacy to 
unauthorized persons.   
The object of these acts is represented by illegally obtained images, sounds or private 
conversations. The text of Article 226 point 2 NCC explicitly postulates: unlawful disclosure, 
dissemination, reporting or transmission must refer to sounds, conversations or images “provisioned 
under point 1 (author’s note – R.S.)”, those that were unlawfully taken, caught, wiretapped or 
recorded. If the images and conversations that were recorded are unlawfully divulged, certain 
particularities are encountered. Thus: 
- if the active subject holds a certain profession or position that allows him to know personal 
secrets, he has, at the same time, the obligation to preserve the confidentiality of these data, the act 
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constituting disclosure of professional secret. (Article 227 NCC). For example
36, if a private 
conversation was recorded by the law enforcement agency on the bases of a judicial authorization
37. 
We consider such a solution to be correct also considering the modification of the legal content of the 
offence relating to the disclosure of the professional secret, since the legislator has abandoned the 
condition according to which the information had to be “entrusted” to the offender;  
- if the offender is any other person, who illicitly intercepted or recorded sounds, conversation 
or images, the act does not constitute an offence, as it is not stipulated under the criminal law. We 
regret such oblivion of the legislator. We do not consider the arguments to be pertinent when stating 
that an unlawful recording of indoor images or private conversations harms intimacy, whilst the 
unlawful disclosure to the public of some illegally obtained images could not render the same effect. 
What is the difference, for example, between the situation in which a private event (for instance an 
onomastic celebration) is unlawfully filmed by an intruder, through the window and then 
disseminated to the public, and the situation in which one of the attendees films the event with his 
mobile phone, having the others’ consent, and then publishes the film on the Internet, although 
lacking the others’ consent? The same problem also rises in the case of unlawful disclosure of indoor 
conversations legally recorded. We shall demonstrate, when analyzing the offence relating to the 
violation of the secret of correspondence that the aggravating form of this act (Article 302 point 4) 
does not refer to this type of conversations. We consider that not incriminating these acts is a 
significant loophole for the system of protection of the individual’s private life, as it is obvious that 
they can seriously harm private life. Otherwise, we believe that it is hard to explain the reason for 
which the NCC incriminates the act of audio-recording of a conversation by one of the participants, 
without the consent of the other and without a legitimate interest, but it does not incriminate the 
unlawful disclosure of the content of such a conversation, if it was legally recorded.  
For these arguments, to which we add those to be discussed under the section of offence 
relating to the violation of the secret of correspondence, we propose that the rule provided by Article 
226 point 2 NCC is completed, as follows: “unlawful disclosure, dissemination, reporting or 
transmission to another person or to the public, of sounds, conversations or images stipulated under 
point 1, legally or illegally collected, is punished […]”. 
According to the law, the disclosure, dissemination, reporting or transmission must be 
communicated either to the public, or to “another person”, namely to a third party. If the perpetrator 
reports the recording exactly to the persons that had the conversation, the act does not constitute the 
content of the aggravating form, and there shall be a concurrence of the offence regarding the 
violation of private life in its standard form and another offence (for example, assault – Article 206 
NCC; extortion – Article 207 NCC). 
The actions of taking, catching or recording images, wiretapping, audio-recording, and also 
the actions of disclosing, disseminating, reporting or transmitting sounds, conversations or images 
have to be made unlawfully, in other words illegally. Therefore, the actions of video, audio or 
                                                 
36 Another example can be identified in a non-penal law containing criminal provisions. Thus, according to 
Article 21 Law No 51/1991 regarding Romania national security, the information related to the private life, honor or 
reputation of the persons incidentally met during the course of collection of data for national security, can not be 
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change by the project of the Law for the enforcement of the Criminal Code, as it can be found on the site: www.just.ro, 
29.01.2012). As it is the case of data obtained during the process of collection of information necessary for national 
security (therefore, including audio recording operations of indoor private conversations), therefore a licit process, it 
means that the unlawful disclosure of legally collected information related to private life by the employees of the secret 
services, constitutes a crime. 
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photographic surveillance do not constitute an offence if made by the law enforcement agencies, as a 
special technique of surveillance or investigation authorized by the judge for rights and freedoms 
(Articles 138-139 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure) or in case of a house search (Article 159 
point 12 of the New Code of Criminal Procedure). 
The absorbed form of the offence regarding the violation of private life is represented by the 
act of unlawfully placing technical devices of audio or visual surveillance in order to commit the acts 
pursuant to point 1 and point 2. Placing technical devices for audio or visual recording represents the 
action of laying, putting, fixing, and installing together with its result. We consider that this 
equipment must be functional, able to capture sounds or images, regardless of the fact it actually 
functions or not.  
In this case, there are certain preparatory acts necessary to commit the offences pursuant to 
the standard or aggravating form of the offence, which however, according to the legislator’s will, 
were incriminated as independent and were more seriously punished than the scope-acts themselves. 
The problem rising is whether there is only one offence or one concurrence, in case a scope-offence 
was committed. The doctrine
38 stated that only the absorbed form of the offence is to be considered. 
One can argue this by postulating that if the legislator had intended that the acts constituted a 
concurrence, he would have explicitly mentioned it, as he had done it in other cases
39.  
We consider that one can postulate a separate opinion. We find the uncommon punishing 
regime for the preparatory acts (even more sever than the one stipulated for the scope-act) reveals the 
legislator’s will that, when the scope-act are committed, the acts shall constitute a concurrence of the 
offence stipulated by Article 226 point 1 or, depending on the situation, point 2, and the offence 
under Article 226 point 5 NCC. If only the absorbed form stipulated by Article 226 point 5 is 
reckoned, the result would be that the preparatory acts absorb the full offence. If the doctrine 
generally adopts the idea that the full offence naturally absorbs the intended offence and the 
preparatory acts (the so-called natural complexity
40), in fact the validity of the mutual thesis has 
never been reckoned. However, it is hard to admit that the offence, which from an objective point of 
view is less harmful for the society and individual, could comprise the most severe one.  
Admitting this opinion could also raise some inequities; for example, the person who placed 
technical means of audio-recording of a private conversation, but he failed to commit the actual 
recording, he would be subjected to a sanction that has the same limits as for the person who 
succeeded to wiretap the conversation. However, an actual harming of the victim’s private life, 
namely what the criminal law intends to prevent, was done in the second case, and not in the first. 
Likewise, if we admit this point of view, it would mean that we encourage the person to use 
the technical devices for audio-recording he had placed, as he is aware that his situation can no 
longer be aggravated. Or, the distinct incrimination of these preparatory acts has the nature of an 
obstacle-offence, meaning an act that – as it renders a social peril by the fact that its own commission 
allows the commission of another, which is more serious – is specifically incriminated to prevent the 
commission of the latter. 
                                                 
38 See V. Dobrinoiu, N. Neagu, op. cit., pg.178. 
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40 Specifically see V. Dongoroz, Curs de drept penal, Cursuri Litografiate PH, Bucureşti, 1942, pg.307; I. 
Fodor în V. Dongoroz, S. Kahane, I. Oancea, I. Fodor, N. Iliescu, C. Bulai, R. Stănoiu, Explicaţii teoretice ale Codului 
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We believe, on the basis of these arguments, that the act of unlawful placing of technical 
devices to audio or video record, with the scope of violating private life, has the nature of an 
autonomous offence in relation to the scope-offence. It would have definitely been desirable that, 
from the point of view of the legislative technique, this offence had a distinct article, and not a point 
of the Article 226 NCC, but we consider that this legislator’s “negligence” does not impede us to 
consider a concurrence including the instrument-offence and the scope-offence. It is in fact the 
solution admitted in the case of other similar situations
41.  
Regardless we refer to the standard, aggravating or absorbed form of the offence, the resulting 
effect is a harm of the person’s private life.    
In respect to the mental element, the act is committed with intention, most of the time direct 
intention, and the oblique one can also be encountered. In the absorbed form, the culpability is only 
direct intention based on its scope. 
The active subject of this offence can be any person who fulfils the conditions for the mental 
element, and penal concurrence is possible in all its three forms.  
Article 226 point 4 stipulates four justifiable special causes. Thus, the act constitutes an 
offence under the following circumstances:  
a) when the offence was committed by the one who participated in the meeting with the 
victim, whereat sounds, conversations and images were wiretapped, under the condition to justify a 
legitimate interest. The legitimate interest refers to the protection of certain important social values 
(for example, the offender audio records the conversation with his wife – who is confessing that she 
is having sexual relations with another man – can be justified by the interest to sustain the reasons for 
divorce);  
   b) if the victim explicitly acted with the intention of being seen or heard by the offender. 
As a premise, this justifiable cause implies that there was no meeting between the victim and the 
offender, as otherwise it would be confounded with the previous hypothesis. For example, this 
special justifiable cause can function when several high school students, seeing that on the corridor of 
their school, a TV coverage is shot, they start talking loudly, due to their specific rebellious behavior, 
about what they did in a school trip, being aware and with the intent that these conversations are 
caught and recorded by the technical device used by the reporter; thus they can not complain later 
about violation of their intimacy. 
This situation excludes the offence, on grounds that the victim himself gave up the right to 
protection of the intimacy, thus one can not ask for more diligence from the third party. The law 
stipulates that the intention of the victim to be seen or heard is explicit, meaning an obvious, clear 
and evident behavior. The intention is explicit if any other person in the offender’s place had 
understood the same think from the victim’s behavior: that the latter intends to be seen or heard. 
Another issue rises, related to this justifiable special cause, whether it functions in the form 
pursuant to Article 226 point 1 as well as in that under point 2. Still, we find that such a conclusion 
must be detailed. The content of the text implies that the victim has to behave with the purpose of 
being seen or heard by the offender, and not by a third party or by the public. If, on the bases of this 
consent, there is a justification for the act of taking pictures, filming, audio recording, one can not 
always claim the same in respect to the disclosure, dissemination, reporting or transmission to other 
persons the information obtain as such. The doctrine
42 presented the example of a woman who 
widely opened the window and took off her clothes looking in a provocative manner to the offender, 
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who was her neighbor, and it was reasonably demonstrated that taking pictures of that woman was 
not an offence. We do not consider that the same conclusion can be drawn in regards to the 
reproduction and display of the picture in the corridor of the condominium where the victim dwells. 
One can but reluctantly state that, if the victim acted with the intent to be seen by the offender, who is 
her neighbor, she also acted with the intent to be seen by all the neighbors and that the offender has 
the right to show the picture he took to the neigbors. Despite this conclusion, the act of disseminating 
the picture shall remain unpunished (even if the special justifiable cause does not operate) because, as 
we previously mentioned, the NCC incriminates nothing else but the disclosure, dissemination, 
reporting or transmission to third parties or to the public, of the indoor images and conversations that 
were unlawfully recorded; or, for this example, taking pictures is not forbidden by the law, meaning 
it is licit. It is our opinion that this is another loophole in the protection system of the individual’s 
intimacy stipulated by the NCC; 
c) if the offender observes the commission of an offence or he supports to establish the 
commission of an offence. This special justifiable cause can be explained by the public interest that 
the protection of the criminal law over the individual’s private life is not debauched into an umbrella 
for criminality;  
d) if the agent notices acts of public interest, which are important for the life of the 
community and the disclosure of which brings public advantages that are more significant than the 
prejudice they cause to the victim. The justifiable nature of such circumstances can be explained by 
the necessity to keep a balance in the interaction between private and public interest, being a specific 
stipulation of the provisions under Article 26 point 2 from the Constitutional Law, according to 
which “natural person has the right to decide about himself, if he does not breach […] public order 
[…]”. 
In the case of the offence relating to violation of private life in its standard and aggravating 
forms, the prosecution is initiated upon the complaint of the victim. This stipulation does not apply to 
the absorbed form, which is initiated ex officio.  
Disclosure of professional secret (Article 227 NCC). The offence consists of the unlawful 
disclosure of data or information regarding a person’s private life, which can cause harm to a person, 
by the one who obtained them due to his profession or position and who has the obligation not to 
disclose these confidential data.  
In the Criminal Code of 1968, this offence was incriminated by Article 196. The NCC does 
not bring significant changes to the legal content of the offence, but it presents certain elements more 
accurately.  
Thus, the generic phrase “the disclosure of certain data”, which had an indefinite aspect and 
thus relatively uncertain, in favor of the one relating to “data or information regarding a person’s 
private life” (for example, those regarding the individual’s health, sexual orientation, etc.). 
Likewise, the NCC specifies more adequately the active subject, meaning a person who 
accumulates two conditions: he knows the respective information due to his profession or position 
and has the obligation not to disclose those confidential data. In the system of the Criminal Code of 
1968, the offender could also be a person to whom the information had been entrusted. Article 227 
NCC does not maintain this condition, which makes us assess that the offence is committed 
whatsoever the active subject had known those data with the victim’s consent or not
43. 
For this offence, the NCC decided for a harsher punishing system than the one under the 
Criminal Code of 1968. 
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Harassment (Article 208 NCC). This offence is not included in the Criminal Code of 1968. 
Similar incriminations can be encountered in foreign legislations
44.  
Harassment is regulated in a standard and a mitigating form.  
The standard form is the act of a person who systematically and unlawfully or without 
legitimate interest, observes a person or monitors his residence, professional office or other places 
that the victim usually attends, thus causing him to fear.  
The mitigating form is the act of making phone calls or communicating through electronic 
devices, which due to frequency or content, causes a person to fear.  
The standard form, the material element of the offence is, alternatively, represented by the 
action of observing a person or monitoring his residence, office or other places he usually attends. 
To observe a persons – as postulated under Article 208 NCC – means to keep under 
observation, to lurk, monitor his behavior, programme, and life, such a manner that the victim 
becomes anxious and worried. We do not believe that verbum regens is limited only to the strict 
meaning of the verb “to observe”, meaning only the action of walking or running after someone; in 
fact, the incrimination refers to keeping a person under observation, in any way. We base our opinion 
on the meaning of the term “to harass”, meaning not leaving alone, bother, causing all sorts of 
displeasures. 
Consequently, we consider that the material element of the external element is render not only 
by the offender’s action of taking the same road as the victim (although they do not know each 
other), walking close behind him every morning, despite the fact that the victim – who notices this – 
changes his schedule or itinerary; or waiting and observing the victim by car, every evening when the 
latter leaves his working place for home; but also when, for example, the boss repeatedly gives tasks 
to a subordinate, forcing him to stay over, just in those days when the latter must be, due to family 
reasons, at a certain hour in a certain place (for example, the school where his child studies), or 
repeatedly and temporarily hiding objects that are indispensable (for instance, the mouse of the 
computer) for the victim to urgently write a paper; or ostentatiously displaying food products in the 
office where a certain person works, each day when the latter, due to religious conviction, fasts (for 
example, on Fridays), thus being the subject of his colleagues’ amusement. For this reason, we 
consider that, unlike other authors
45, the legislator did not excluded ab initio the teasing gestures of 
the neighbors from the incrimination sphere of harassment; one must investigate, from case to case, 
whether such actions are the expression of a control that the offender has over the victim’s regular 
programme. For instance, the fact that every time the victim gets ready to leave home by car, he finds 
the access area to the parking place blocked by one of his neighbors’ car may be considered 
observation as stipulated under Article 208 NCC. 
To monitor a certain place means to lurk, keep under control, under attention. The act of 
monitoring must refer to the dwelling, working place or other places usually visited by the victim. 
“Usually visited places” must be understood as those places where the victim regularly goes (for 
example, a medical office where a pregnant woman systematically goes, the faculty where a student 
goes almost every day, the bar where the victim meets with his friends every weekend). All theses 
places mentioned by the legislator – home, working place, usually visited places – define the 
constancies of a person’s behavior, so that their observance indicate the action of keeping under 
observation the victim’s everyday programme. We note that the law does not require that the victim 
is in those places at the moment when the offender commits the act of observation, this fact being 
irrelevant.  
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Both ruling means express actions through which the offender has a certain control, even 
temporarily, over the victim’s regular life. According to our opinion, this is the substance of the 
offence of harassment.  
Three fundamental conditions are necessary to be fulfilled. First of all, both observing and 
monitoring must be repeated, which makes harassment a habitual offence. An isolated act of 
observation or monitoring does not constitute the content of this offence. The law claims for multiple 
actions (in the case of habitual offences, our judicial practice usually stops at three), made at certain 
time periods, thus rendering the offender’s habit. A thorough investigation of the period of time 
between actions, but corroboration with the victim’s schedule, is extremely significant in the process 
of establishing whether the offender has or not the victim’s schedule under observation. According to 
our opinion, the key is not the objective period of time between the offender’s actions, but whether 
they are regular in respect to the victim’s schedule. For instance, if the victim takes the same route to 
his working place everyday, the offender’s presence on the same route every time, can constitute 
harassment; likewise, the offender’s appearance in front of the victim’s house whenever he celebrates 
his marriage day. For both examples, even if the elapsed time between the material acts is obviously 
different (a day – a year), there is a correspondence between the offender’s and the victim’s behavior, 
thus we can talk about harassment. On the other hand, the sporadic, irregular appearance, endows a 
rather occasional nature to the offender’s action, questioning the existence of the offence. 
A second fundamental condition is that the observation or monitoring is unlawful or without a 
legitimate interest. The act of observing a person’s moves and activities, as a special technical of 
surveillance or investigation used by the law enforcement agencies (Article 138 point 6 New Code of 
Criminal Procedure), does not constitute the offence of harassment, when it is authorized by the 
competent judge. Likewise, we assess as legitimate a husband’s monitoring of his wife’s lover, while 
the latter is inside, or a journalist’s monitoring a dignitary about whom he possesses information of 
being involved in an illegal activity.  
A third fundamental condition is implicit, derived from the resulting effect of the offence, 
which is the victim’s state of fear. The actions of observation or monitoring must be known, 
observed by the victim
46, even if he does not know who the offender is; otherwise, they could not 
induce him a state of fear. Such acts do not constitute the offence of harassment, but they can 
obviously have criminal relevance under different circumstances (for example, repeated covert 
observation of the victim’s everyday schedule can constitute a preparatory act for an offence of theft 
or robbery).  
For the mitigating form, the material element is given by the action of making calls or 
communications through means of remote communication. The telephone call implies the action that 
produces a signal, usually an audio one, which indicates the intent of initiating a telephonic 
connection. To communicate means to reveal, transmit information; in order accomplish the content 
of this form of harassment, the communication must be made through means of remote 
communication (telephone, telegraph, mail), and not directly.  
The telephonic calls or communications must be made in such a way that, due to frequency, 
or content, they cause a person to fear.  
We agree to the opinion expressed by the doctrine
47 according to which, also in the case of the 
mitigating form, the offence is still a habitual one, as the law uses the plural (telephonic calls or 
communications). If there is only one communication that, through its content, causes the person to 
fear, the action does not constitute harassment, but can constitute an offence of threatening (Article 
206 NCC).  
We consider it useful, hereby, to stress an essential difference between the offences of 
harassment and of threatening. The two acts are similar in respect to the resulting effect (state of 
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fear), but are different in respect to the material element of the external element. In the case of 
threatening, the action is to cause the passive subject a state of fear that harm will be done to him due 
to an offence or a another damaging act against him or another, whereas in the case of harassment, 
the state of fear is induced by the circumstances that the victim’s life is the object of the offender’s 
observation. In the first situation, the cause of fear is the direct threat coming from the offender; 
while in the second, there is an indirect cause derived from what might happen if the offender has the 
control over the victim’s regular schedule. In the case of threatening, the peril for the passive subject 
is known (he is to suffer the offence or the damaging act that he is threatened with), in the case of 
harassment, the fear comes from an infinite of eventual perils due to the circumstances that the 
offender has his behavior under control and observation. Hence, we believe that this is also the 
reason for the subsidiary nature of harassment in respect to the act of threatening, thus, every time, 
the repeated observation of the victim is doubled by threats of committing offences, and the act shall 
constitute a continuous offence of threatening and not harassment. For example, when, every 
evening, on his way from the office back to home, the victim is observed by the offender who 
threatens to kill him.  
The criminal punishment for the offence of harassment is different in regards to the forms 
postulated under Article 208 NCC. Thus, for the standard form, the penalty is 3 to 6 months 
imprisonment or a fine. In the case of mitigating form, the offender is liable to imprisonment from 
one to 3 months or a fine, if the act does not constitute a more serious offence. Such a case could be 
encountered when, due to the offender’s repeated telephonic calls, the victim panics and thereafter 
commits suicide; if the offender had a clear foresight and accepts the attendant consequence, the 
offence is of determining or facilitating suicide (Article 191 NCC), and the law stipulates a harsher 
punishment.  
The prosecution for the offence of harassment is initiated upon the complaint of the victim.  
II.2. The protection of home. We shall refer, for this matter, to the offences relating to the 
violation of home and the violation of professional office.  
The violation of home (Article 224 NCC). The standard form of this offence is identical to the 
one in the Criminal code of 1968.  
The NCC has introduced a modification in respect to the aggravating form, abandoning the 
hypothesis in which violation of home is committed by two or more persons together. When the 
offence is committed by three or more persons together, this shall determine the legal aggravating 
circumstances under Article 77 letter a) NCC to be considered.  
Another modification was also made in respect to procedural issues, thus the prosecution is 
initiated upon the complaint of the victim for both the forms of the offence relating to the violation of 
home.  
Likewise, the legislator opted for a milder punishing regime, in respect to the Criminal Code 
of 1968, in the case of this offence.  
The violation of professional office (Article 225 NCC). This offence was not incriminated by 
the Criminal Code of 1968; but it was stipulated under the Law No 301/2004, which did not come 
into force, under a similar regulation as the offence of violation of home
48. 
This new incrimination is intended to protect intimacy in a working place, the commercial 
private life, closely tied to the professional premises – the Romanian legislator’s source of inspiration 
being ECHR jurisprudence.  
The act is incriminated in a standard and an aggravating form. The standard one constitutes of 
unlawful entering, by any means, in any of the offices where a legal or natural person conducts its 
professional activity or the denial to leave it when the entitled persons asks so. The aggravating form 
can be encountered when the act is committed by an armed person, during the night or by fraudulent 
capacities.  
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As to the legal content, the violation of professional office is significantly similar to the 
violation of home. For example, the material element is represented by the same actions (the act of 
entering a certain place or the denial to leave it), there is the same essential condition (unlawfully), 
the aggravating form is similar, and the punishing regime is identical.  
Several comments are necessary regarding the material object of the offence. It is the case for 
any of the premises where the natural or legal person conducts his professional activity.  
Office generally means the place where a public institution, organization or company has its 
administration and conducts its activity. It is the attribute meant to place an agency within space. 
From a criminal point of view, the concept of office is not limited only to legal persons, and it also 
extends to natural persons who conduct a professional activity. It can be a place where central or 
local authorities, public authorities, companies, familial organizations, authorized natural persons; 
privateers
49 (lawyers, doctors) conduct their activities.  
It is essential that the incriminated activity refers to a place where a professional activity is 
conducted. As long as this condition is fulfilled, it does no longer matter whether the office is a 
partially or totally opened space (for example, an enclosed construction site or a land demarcated by 
signs, from which agricultural workers harvest), if it is immobile or can be divided and moved (for 
example, a tent where circus rehearsals are conducted). Otherwise, the act of entering a place called 
office, but where no activity is conducted, does not constitute an offence: for instance, the office of 
the so-called “shell-companies”. 
We consider compulsory that the professional activity, related to the office, is a legal one. We 
do not consider that criminal law intended to provide protection to the spaces where, constantly, 
illicit activities are carried out, as the legislator can not protect what himself prohibits. Consequently, 
the protection stipulated under Article 225 NCC does not operate, for example, in the case of the 
office of an unauthorized cigarettes or fuel factory, brothels, clandestine casinos. On the other hand, 
we can discuss he problem of committing, associated to these places, the offence of violation of 
home, under the circumstances those spaces are used at the same time also as home by those 
involved in such activities (for example, a prostitute who lives in the same building where she 
receives her clients). 
We agree with the opinion that the passive subject of this offence is but a natural person using 
the office being violated
50, even if the office is owned by a legal person
51. The offence of violation of 
professional office is part of the crimes against private life, therefore it can not be otherwise analyzed 
but in connection with the natural persons. The incriminating form protects the individual’s intimacy 
at his working place, and not the authority of the natural or legal person that conducts the activity 
inside that office, as the doctrine has stated
52. 
II.3. The protection of correspondence. We consider this category includes the offences 
relating to the violation of the secret of correspondence, illegal surveillance of a transmission of IT 
data and the unauthorized transfer of IT data. 
Violation of the secret of correspondence (Article 302 NCC). The act is incriminated in a 
standard, three aggravating and an absorbed form.  
A first comment over this offence is related to the fact it was included in the chapter relating 
to professional offences. We find the legislator’s motivation criticisable. It is undeniably that 
violation of the secret of correspondence, if committed by a public servant, also harms the social 
relations associated to the well-development of the activities and the reputation that public authorities 
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and institutions ought to receive, but we consider that the key social value that is therefore harmed by 
this offence, especially when the offender is a public servant, continues to be the individual private 
life
53. Moreover, this thesis is also valid if the offence is committed by a non-special subject. As if to 
deepen more the confusion, the Law of enforcement of the criminal Code (Article 245)
54 stipulates 
that “the provisions under Article 302 of the Criminal Code apply regardless of them having been 
committed within professional relationships or outside of them (author’s note – R.S.)”. 
For the standard form, the offence is committed by unlawfully opening, taking, destroying or 
retaining a correspondence that is addressed to another person, as well as the unlawful disclosure of 
the content of a correspondence, even when this was sent opened or was accidently opened.  
The offence is more serious when it is committed by unlawful interception of a conversation 
or communication made by telephone or by any other electronic means of communication.  
In principle, these two forms of the offence have a content similar to the one in the Criminal 
Code of 1968, but it has been adopted a more correct systematization of the rules. Thus, the standard 
form of the NCC includes the ruling means related to the so-called classic correspondence (for 
example, letters), whilst the form under Article 302 point 2 refers to telephonic correspondence or by 
other electronic means of communication.  
In regards to the second form, we notice – on the one hand – that the legislator refers to the 
communications made by any electronic means of communication, thus including by e-mail. It would 
have been better to avoid such a concurrence of rules, especially in the case of a comprehensive law 
as the Criminal Code. We consider that the offence under Article 361 NCC absorbs the offence of 
violation of the secret of correspondence, thus it being obvious that its special judicial object is 
represented not only by the social values and relations associated with the security and integrity of IT 
systems and data, but also with the individual private life. Likewise, even the punishing system, 
which is harsher than in the case of illegal interception of a transmission of IT data leads to this 
conclusion. 
On the other hand, direct private conversations and communications between individuals shall 
not constitute the object of protection stipulated by Article 302 point 2 NCC. Unlawful wiretapping 
constitutes the offence of violation of private life (Article 226 NCC). 
For the second aggravating form, the acts stipulated under point 1 and point 2 are committed 
by a public servant who has the legal obligation to respect the professional secret and confidentiality 
of the information he has access to. We notice that the NCC has limited the sphere of the active 
subject for this form of violation of the secret of correspondence, mentioning only the public 
servant
55 (as it is defined under Article 175 NCC), and not any other servants.  
A third aggravating form consists of unlawful disclosure, dissemination, reporting and 
transmission to another person or to the public of the content of an intercepted conversation or 
communication, also when the offender knew about it by mistake or accidently.  
We can make some interesting comments in respect to this form of the offence.  
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Firstly, the way the legislator conceived the Article 302 point 4 NCC reveals that the law 
penalizes the disclosure, dissemination, reporting and transmission to another person or to the public 
of the content of any conversation or communication made by telephone or electronic devices, 
regardless of it having been legally or illegally intercepted. The content of the Article 302 point 4 
makes no reference to the hypothesis under point 2, thus unlawful interceptions have not been taken 
into consideration. If the NCC would have intended to exclusively refer to illegal interceptions, it 
would have explicitly mentioned them, as it is the situation, for example, of violation of private life 
(Article 226 point 2 NCC incriminates disclosure, dissemination, reporting and transmission of 
“sounds, conversations or images stipulated by point 1 (author’s note – R.S.)”, thus of those 
unlawfully recorded). Consequently, the act of unlawful disclosure of a legally intercepted 
conversation or communication shall constitute an offence, as well as the unlawful disclosure of an 
illegally intercepted conversation.  
Secondly, if the content of an e-mail correspondence is disclosed, we shall have the 
aggravating form of violation of the secret of correspondence if that specific communication was 
legally intercepted, and if not, we shall have a concurrence of offences (violation of the secret of 
correspondence in its aggravating form and the illegal interception of IT data). This is due to the fact 
that the chapter relating to the offences against the security and integrity of IT systems and data does 
not incriminate the act of unlawful disclosure of illegally intercepted IT data
56. 
Thirdly, the offence of Article 302 point 4 NCC does not envisage the content of direct 
communications between two persons. Their unlawful disclosure can constitute violation of private 
life, in its aggravating form, if the conditions under Article 226 point 2 NCC are accomplished.  
This issue needs a more comprehensive analysis. By analyzing the incrimination manner of 
illegal interception of personal conversations helps us notice that the Romanian legislator has 
somehow distanced from the meaning that ECHR jurisprudence consecrates to the concept of 
correspondence: the communication of thoughts and information by any means (verbally, by letters, 
telegrams, fax, telex, pager, telephone, e-mail, SMS, MMS). Inside the NCC, correspondence by 
means of remote communication (letters, telegrams, telephonic conversations, etc.), the elementary 
rule that penalizes the interception is Article 302 – the violation of the secret of correspondence; 
otherwise, for direct private communications or conversations, the basic text is Article 226 – the 
violation of private life.  
We shall analyze the way the legislator regulates the issue of disclosing someone else’s 
correspondence. As we have mentioned above, the unlawful disclosure, dissemination, reporting and 
transmission of the conversations and communications made by telephone or electronic means of 
communication, regardless of being legally or illegally intercepted, constitutes violation of the secret 
of correspondence (Article 302 point 4). The unlawful disclosure of the content of the recorded 
indoor conversations constitutes violation of private life, but only when the recording was illegally 
made (Article 226 point 2). 
Otherwise, the new criminal law does not stipulate – in principle – that the act of unlawful 
disclosure of the content of an indoor conversation that was legally recorded
57. For example, when 
handwriting a testament, the testator admits him being the father of a child outside marriage, in order 
to dissolute any eventual doubts, and he asks a friend to assist him and audio-video record him while 
reading the testament. He also asks him to give the tape to the legal inheritances only after his death. 
Not happy with his share of the fortune, the friend, before the subject’s death, shows this tape to the 
wife of the testator, thus finding out about her husband’s past extramarital affair. The act obviously 
harms the testator’s intimacy. However, it is not stipulated as so by the penal law; the 
communications of the victim were recorded with his consent, thus their unlawful disclosure does not 
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constitute violation of private life and neither the violation of the secret of correspondence, as they 
were not made by means of remote communication.  
The above mentioned hypothesis could be considered as included under the provisions of 
Article 302 point 4 NCC, which refers to conversations or communications, but it does not include 
also the rest of the phrase in point 2 (”made by phone or any other means of electronic 
communication”), thus not being detailed. Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemus. 
We are reluctant to this argument. The etymology of the terms used by the legislator show 
that Article 302 NCC has never taken into consideration the indoor conversations, and only those 
made by means of remote communication. In the case of violation of the secret of correspondence 
the adjective “intercepted” was used, being derived from the verb “to intercept”, which means to 
detect and control a telephonic conversation, a correspondence between two persons
58. The new 
criminal legislation uses the concept of “interception” only when it refers to the conversations and 
communications made by means of remote communication (in the case of violation of the secret of 
correspondence, of illegal interception of IT data transfer), whilst in the case of direct conversations 
between two or more persons, face to face, only the terms “wiretapping” and “recording” are used (as 
in the case of violation of private life). The criminal proceeding legislation adheres to the same 
semantics. The Criminal Proceedings Code of 1968 refers, in Article 91
1, to the “interception and 
recording of conversations and communications made by telephone or by any other electronic means 
of communication (author’s note – R.S.)”, whilst Article 91
4, refers to indoor conversations, the 
legislator uses only the term of recording, avoiding interception. The New Criminal Proceeding Code 
stipulates it more clearly: according to Article 138, not only interceptions of conversations and 
communications, but also video, audio or photographic surveillance are considered special 
techniques of surveillance or investigation. The phrase interception of conversations and 
communications is defined under Article 13 point 2, by referring to conversations or communications 
“made by telephone, IT system or any other means of communication (author’s note – R.S.)”, 
excluding direct (indoor) conversations, as the latter are associated to video, audio or photographic 
surveillance, which also means “recording the conversations” (author’s note – R.S.)” of persons. 
On the basis of these arguments, we reiterate the proposal – already postulated under the 
analysis of the violation of private life – that the text of Article 226 point 2 NCC is properly 
completed.  
The absorbed form of the offence was introduced by the draft of the Law for the enforcement 
of the Criminal Code (Article 246 point 10)
59 and consists of unlawful possession or manufacturing 
of special means of intercepting and recording communications. The act is currently incriminated in a 
similar manner under Article 19 thesis II Law no15/1991
60. 
This form is nothing but the incrimination, as a stand-alone offence, for the preparatory acts 
of violation of the secret of correspondence.  
Several comments ought to be made regarding the absorbed form of the offence.  
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Firstly, we notice that the legislator atypically uses the term “communications” and not 
“conversations” or “communications”. By communication we understand the action to communicate 
and its result, meaning to bring something to knowledge, inform, notify, and conversation means a 
talk, a discussion. Yet, the concept of communications defines the means of communication between 
different points or technical systems used to accomplish the action of communicating. Thus, 
communications represent the means through which individuals communicate (telephone, telegraph, 
mail, radio, electronic mail, etc.) as this is the accurate meaning of the terms, we consider it obvious 
that it is not the “communications” that can be intercepted or recorded (for example, it is not the 
telephone that is wiretapped – as we often encounter in everyday speech), but “the communications” 
or, depending on the situation, “the conversations”, namely the communicated information (for 
instance, by telephonic communications). Therefore, we consider that the legislator misused the word 
“communications”, the syntagma of “special means of intercepting or recording of communications”, 
hereinafter referred to as conversations and communications.  
Secondly, as the law does not mention the type of conversations or communications, we 
assess that unlawful possession or manufacturing constitutes an offence when the special means is 
destined to intercept or record telephonic conversations or by any electronic means of 
communication and also when it is destined to wiretap or record private indoor conversations. The 
exception is for IT devices and recordings designed and adapted to commit the offence of illegal 
interception of a transmission of IT data, and whose unlawful possession or manufacturing is 
separately incriminated (illegal operations using illegal IT devices or programmes – Article 365 
NCC).  
Thirdly, as the absorbed form of the violation of the secret of correspondence postulated 
under Article 302 point 6 NCC, has the nature of a habitual-offence (it is incriminated in order to 
prevent the commission of more sever offences, the unlawful interception of a conversation), we 
consider that it is not absorbed by the aggravating form postulated under point 2, and therefore they 
shall form a concurrence of offences. Certainly, we envisage the situation in which the possession 
and interception have the nature of relatively autonomous activities in respect to their frame time, and 
not the situation when, absolutely naturally, the first is comprised by the second; it is obvious that the 
operation of interception inherently implies the possession of special means, thus, it can not be the 
case of concurrence. However, it shall be concurrence when, for example, a private detective 
possesses such means, in his office, for a long time, using them only on certain occasions, when a 
client asks him so.  
A particular situation is met when the unlawful possession or manufacturing regards the 
special means for recording the indoor conversations. Thus, if they are placed and later used, we 
consider it shall be no concurrence of three offences: violation of private life in its standard form 
(Article 226 point 1), violation of private life in the absorbed form (Article 226 point 5), and 
violation of the secret of correspondence in the absorbed form (Article 302 point 6). 
In respect to the criminal punishment of the violation of the secret of correspondence, we note 
that unlawful disclosure of the content of an intercepted conversation or communication is punished 
more sever that the disclosure of the content of a classic communication. The situation is justified 
due to the ampleness of the interpersonal communication by technical means in modern society. We 
find it hard to understand the legislator’s choice to stipulate a milder penalty for the disclosure of the 
content of the intercepted communication (imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years or a fine) 
compared to the offence relating to the unlawful interception of a conversation or communication 
made by telephone or by any other means of communication (the penalty being imprisonment from 6 
months to 3 years or a fine). We find it very important the harm brought to private life, for example, 
when certain intimate information are disclosed to the public by the offender, thus the person’s 
intimacy becoming a general subject of gossip, compared to the situation in which the offender is the 
only one to find about that information, when he intercepts a victim’s telephonic conversation. 
Likewise, it is difficult understand why the legislator opted a such a penalty system for the violation 202  Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Legal sciences 
of the secret of correspondence, whilst in the case of violation of private life by audio recording of a 
private conversation and, respectively, by disclosing such a conversation to a third party or to the 
public, the penalties stipulated by the law are increasing: imprisonment from one month to 6 months 
or a fine relating to recording, respectively, imprisonment from 3 months to 2 years or a fine relating 
to disclosure.  
Such an inconsistency allows us to conclude that it is a concurrence of the offence provided 
by point 2 and the one provided by point 4, at least for the case of violation of the secret of 
correspondence, if the offender discloses the content of a telephonic conversation that was 
unlawfully intercepted. The situation is relatively unusual as the disclosure is not possible without a 
prior interception, whereas the penalty requires it; thus being hard to accept that an offence 
stipulating a milder sanction (the disclosure) could absorb the one stipulating a more severe one (the 
interception).  
The legislator devoted only two of the justifiable special causes specific to the violation of 
private life, for the violation of the secret of correspondence (if the offender notices the commission 
of an offence or contributes by evidence that an offence was committed or if he notices acts of public 
interest, which are significant to the life of the community and whose disclosure has public 
advantages that are more important than the prejudice caused to the victim); the other two not being 
compatible with the acts of interception of correspondence or of the conversations or 
communications made by telephone or electronic means.  
From the proceeding point of view, the offence of violation of the secret of correspondence, 
the prosecution is initiated upon the complaint of the victim, only for the standard form; the initial 
text of Article 302, which excludes ex officio investigation for any form of the offence, being 
advanced for a modification under the Law for the enforcement of the Criminal Code. 
Illegal Interception of a transmission of IT information (Article 361 NCC). The NCC copied 
this offence, without any modification in respect to the constituent elements, form the Article 43 of 
the Law no161/2003. The only distinction refers to the penalty regime, which became milder.  
Unauthorized transfer of IT data (Article 364 NCC). The offence of unauthorized transfer of 
IT data is encountered, in an identical form, under the provisions of Article 44 point 2-3 of the Law 
no161/2003. Likewise, for this offence, the legislator opted for a milder punishment. 
IV. Legal interference with private life. If it is compelling that the law assures a complete and 
adequate system of protection of the individual’s intimacy, making also appeal to the coercion 
specific to the criminal law, nonetheless we must admit that private life is not an absolute right. 
Every society admits, for the general interest of its members, the legal possibility of certain public 
authorities to interfere in a person’s intimacy, home or correspondence, related to, for example, the 
prevention and combat of the criminal phenomenon.  
Considering the provisions of the New Criminal Proceedings Code
61, enacted by the Law No 
135/2010, we further propose certain comments regarding the methods and proceedings, which are 
used by the judicial agencies, implying interference with the individuals’ private life. 
Thus, Article 138 NCPC also regulates, under the phrase of special techniques for 
surveillance and investigation, the following proceedings: 
- interception of conversations and communications – meaning the interception, access, 
monitoring, collection or recording of conversations or communications made by telephone, IT 
system or any other means of communication, as well as the recording of trafficking data that 
indicate the source, destination, data, hour, dimension, duration or the type of communication made 
by telephone, IT system or any other means of communication; 
- access to an IT system – means entering an IT system or IT data storage device, either 
directly, or remotely, by the use of specialized programmes or of a network, in order to look for 
evidence; 
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- video, audio or photographic surveillance – means to photograph persons, to observe or 
register their conversations, moves or any other activities; 
- to locate or survey by technical means – the procedure implies the use of certain devices that 
determine the place where a person is at; 
- to withhold, release or search mail communication – means checking, through physical or 
technical means, the letters, other mail communications or the objects sent or received by any means, 
made by the offender, suspect, defendant or any other person suspected of receiving or sending those 
goods from or to the offender, suspect or defendant. 
These measures are taken by the judge for laws and freedoms, if three conditions are 
accomplished at the same time: (i)  there is a reasonable suspicion regarding the preparation or 
commission of a serious crime (for example, those against national security, acts of terrorism, arms 
trafficking, drugs trafficking, human being trafficking, corruption
62); (ii) the measure is proportional 
with the restraint of fundamental rights and freedoms, considering the particularities of the cause, the 
importance of the information or evidences to be collected or the seriousness of the crime; (iii) the 
evidences could not be collected in any other means or their collection may imply great difficulties 
that could jeopardize the investigation or there is a peril for the safety of people or certain valuable 
goods.  
The measures are mandated during the course of investigation, for a period of maximum 30 
days, and can be prolonged, for justifiable reasons; every prolongation must not be longer than 30 
days. The total period for these specific surveillance or investigation techniques, related to the same 
person and the same offence, is of maximum 1 year; the exception being video, audio or 
photographic surveillance that, when made in private places, can not exceed 120 days.  
By derogation from the above mentioned procedure, Article 141 NCPC allows the prosecutor 
to authorize these proceedings, if the three conditions previously mentioned are accomplished, and 
also in case of emergency when the time to obtain a warrant from the competent judge could lead to a 
significant delay of the investigation, or to a loss, impairment, annihilation of evidences, or it could 
jeopardize the safety of the victim, witness or members of their families. The prosecutor can institute 
those measures for a period of maximum 48 hours, having the obligation to inform the judge in order 
to obtain their validation, in a 24 hours timeframe.  
Considering the intrusive conspicuous nature of such measures, the law compels the 
prosecutor to immediately stop the surveillance if the bases on which it was started are no longer 
justifiable and to inform the person in writing, in maximum 10 tens, regarding the measure taken 
against him. If the subject, who has been under surveillance, asks for, he has the right to listen to the 
conversations, communications or discussions and to see the images.  
Another specific surveillance technique that implies interferences with the person’s intimacy 
is that of obtaining the list of telephonic conversations. The measure is instituted by the prosecutor, 
with the previous consent of the judge for rights and freedoms.  
Likewise, house search implies interference in the individual’s private life. This measure can 
be instituted if there is a reasonable suspicion regarding the commission of an offence by a person 
and it is expected that the search leads to the detection and collection of evidences regarding this 
offence, to the preservation of the traces of the offence or to the catching of the suspect or offender. 
House searching is instituted by the judge for rights and freedoms, during investigations, and by the 
institution invested to take it to court, during the course of a trial.  
The law explicitly stipulates that house search must not constitute a disproportionate 
interference in the private life (Article 156 point 2 NCPC). The judicial agencies that perform the 
search can adequately and proportionately use of force, in order to enter a house, in two situations: (i) 
for reliable reasons to anticipate armed defence or other types of violence or in case of risk of 
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destroying the evidences; (ii) in case of denial or if no answer was given to the judicial agencies’ 
requests to enter the house (Article 159 point 17 NCPC). Likewise, the judicial agency has the right 
to open, by force, and avoiding unjustified damages, the rooms, spaces, furniture items and other 
items that might store objects, documents, evidences of the offence or of the searched persons, if the 
possessor is absent or does not wilfully want to open them (Article 159 point 12 NCPC). 
The law allows that the place and the persons or objects found during the search to be 
photographed or recorded on tape or film (Article 159 point 12 NCPC). 
 
Conclusions.  
A complete analysis of the provisions of the NCC allows us to assess that the system for the 
protection of the individual’s private life has substantially improved. This is welcomed both from the 
point of view of the practice requirements and also in order to provide the Romanian legislation with 
the compatibility with the European standards in this matter, and the decision to incriminate certain 
acts evidently representing attacks on a person’s intimacy and that happen more and more often in 
every day life (the violation of private life or the violation of the professional office). We shall see, in 
the following years after the NCC enters into force, to what extent the legislation will ensure the 
prevention function of the criminal law and how it will contribute to the civilizing function that any 
legal system ought to have for the society to which it addresses.  
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